MANIPULATIVE INCENTIVES AND GOODWILL IMPAIRMENT OF LISTED FI-NANCIAL SERVICE FIRMS IN NIGERIA

Ozemoya Osikpemhi Amos Pedro; Salisu Mamman; Ahmed Aliyu Abdullahi; Michael Duru; Aliyu Abubakar

Authors

Ozemoya Osikpemhi Amos Pedro Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria
Salisu Mamman Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria
Ahmed Aliyu Abdullahi Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria
Michael Duru Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria
Aliyu Abubakar Federal University Gusau, Nigeria

Keywords:

Goodwill, Impairment, Manipulative Incentive, Political Cost, Contracting Motive

Abstract

This study assessed the effect of manipulative incentives on goodwill impairment of listed financial service firms in Nigeria. Secondary source of data was used and the data was obtained from the annual reports of the firms. The results from the regression analysis show that political cost and contracting motive have a significant effect on the manipulative incentives on goodwill impairment of listed financial service firms in Nigeria. The study concludes that political cost and contracting motive are determinants of manipulative incentives of goodwill impairment of listed financial service firms in Nigeria. The study therefore recommends among others that regulatory bodies should enforce stringent disclosure requirements mandating comprehensive and transparent reporting regarding goodwill impairment assessments. Also, develop standardized impairment testing procedures, guided by robust methodologies and objective criteria, to limit managerial discretion in impairment assessments. Regulators should conduct periodic reviews to identify potential manipulative incentives.